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I. Introduction 
Following World War II, the industrialized nations of the West committed 
themselves to the creation of liberal international trade and investment 
policies. Such policies were considered essential to economic recovery and 
growth. Free market policies also responded to the belief that protectionist 
governmental activities and private trade restraints had contributed to an 
international environment that ultimately led to the War1. 
In order to minimize governmental constraints, developed Western 
nations created a stable international monetary system2 and agreed to a 
framework intended to foster and enforce liberal trade policies3. The original 
commitment to free trade, manifested in the "General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade" (GATT)4, was cautious and tentative, but it did require that 
participating nations avoid discriminatory tariffs and the use of non-tariff 
barriers5. The members of GATT also agreed to periodic discussions on 
reductions in trade barriers6. 
Private restraints of trade, however, have been left to national and, in the 
notable example of the European Community (herafter: EC)7, multinational 
regulation. The international community has recognized the adverse conse 
quences of restrictive trade practices, and encouraged cooperation among 
nations to limit such practices8. No institution exists, however, to enforce an 
internationally accepted code of conduct. 
1981: L. Pol. Int. Bus. 14 (1982) 1-46 (cited: Antitrust Improvements Act); R. Geiger, 
International Antitrust and Related Trade Issues, in: The United States, Transnational 
Business, and the Law 1-21; H. Gray, International Trade, Investment, and Payments 
(1979); H. Kronstein, The Law of International Cartels (1973) [English text of id., Das Recht 
der internationalen Kartelle (1967)]; A. Lowenfeld, Public Controls on International Trade2 
(1983) (International Economic Law, VI); J. Rahl, International Cartels and Their Regula 
tion, in: Competition in International Business, ed. by O. Schachter/R. Hellawell (1981) 
240-276; W. Reinsch, The Export Trading Company Act of 1981: L. Pol. Int. Bus. 14(1982) 
47-127; F. Root, International Trade and Investment4 (1970); J. Spero, The Politics of 
International Economic Relations2 (1981). 
1 
Lowenfeld ?2.1. 
2 Root 362 f.; Spero 23 f. 
3 
Lowenfeld ?2.2. 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Opened for Signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; see generally, E. Petersmann, Protektionismus als 





7 Arts. 85 and 86 EEC Treaty. 
8 
[United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] "Restrictive Business Practi 
ces in Relation to the Trade and Development of Developing Countries", UNCTAD-Doc. 
TD/B/C.2/119/Rev. 1 (1974), repr. in: Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business Practices I, 
Booklet 6, pp. 370-378. 
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The economic regime established after World War II worked remarkably 
well for several decades, at least for the industrialized nations of the West and 
Japan. The economic recoveries of war-ravaged Germany and Japan were 
extraordinary, and economies throughout the West were robust. Recent 
years, however, have brought significant changes. For one thing, the nations 
of the Third World have become increasingly critical of the system that 
frequently, they believe, frustrated their developmental goals9. The most 
dramatic contemporary changes, however, have been the result of develop 
ments in the economies of the major industrialized nations. The post-War 
system was built upon the dominant position of the United States and its 
currency10. The international economy of the non-Socialist World has, how 
ever, become tri-polar now that the EC (led economically by Germany) and 
Japan are major participants in the international marketplace11. In light of this 
new reality, American economic leadership became an unacceptable burden 
to the United States and its major trading partners12. The regime established 
after the War has been abandoned and the Western World is searching for a 
new order. 
These new economic realities have probably brought the developed 
nations of the West and Japan to the most critical point in post-World War II 
history. Although the United States remains politically and militarily domi 
nant in the West, Americans must adjust economically, politically and 
psychologically to a diminished economic role while Japan and Europe 
assume more of the responsibilities of leadership. The ultimate challenge of 
this decade may be the creation of an international framework that can 
support healthy commercial rivalry while maintaining vital economic and 
political unity; the greatest threat is that the major economic powers will turn 
to protectionist policies which in the past led to downward economic spirals 
which left the world poorer and politically and militarily unstable13. The 
dangers should not be exaggerated, but must be recognized if national policy 
makers are to rise above parochial interests. 
This article deals with a narrow aspect of the broader issue which has been 
outlined. It explores the extraterritorial application of the United States' 
antitrust laws as an instrument of progressive international economic policy. 
American legal scholarship on extraterritorial application normally focuses 
on the rules periodically announced by federal courts in determining whether 
they may or should exercise jurisdiction in cases involving foreign nationals 
or conduct occurring outside of the United States14. The literature traces the 
9 Root 431-438. 
10 
Spero 26 f. 
11 





14 E. g., Atwood/Brewster I ??6.01-6.11; Fw^die eh. 2. 
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developments from the rigid territorial approach announced by Justice 
Holmes in the American Banana decision15, through the expansive effects 
standard generally attributed to the Alcoa decision16, to the currently popular 
comity, or balancing of interests, analysis originally developed by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Timberlane case17. This article concentrates on 
the implications of several contemporary legislative enactments as reflections 
of a policy of withdrawal from the American commitment to foster liberal 
international trade policies through the extraterritorial application of its 
antitrust laws. 
Initially, two points should be clarified. First, the term "antitrust law" is 
used here in a very broad sense encompassing the fundamental American 
commitment to an economy that is organized by private choices made within 
the framework of competitive markets. This commitment is primarily 
embodied in the provisions of secs. 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act18 and sec. 7 of 
the Clayton Act19. Secondly, this article will not attempt to identify the outer 
15 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
16 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
17 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
18 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1, states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million 
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion 
of the court. 
Section 2, 15 U.S.C. ?2, provides: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction therof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million 
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion 
of the court. 
19 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 18, provides in relevant part: 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, 
directly, or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantial 
ly to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital and no person subject to thejurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis 
sion shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in 
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi 
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limits of the extraterritorial reach of national laws under international law and 
convention. No clear line can be drawn. It is assumed, however, that the 
United States may impose its antitrust policies on domestic firms engaging in 
enterprise activities within American territory irrespective of the location of 
any adverse consequences of those activities. So, the United States may, for 
example, outlaw a domestic conspiracy to fix the prices of goods sold abroad. 
The article also assumes generally that foreign activities having at least a 
direct, substantial and foreseeable adverse effect on the commerce of the 
United States may be prohibited. 
II. Economic Background 
Economic theories regarding the benefits and drawbacks of free interna 
tional trade are complex and cannot be fully developed here. The same 
applies in regard to the significant non-economic values fostered by interna 
tional free markets and by restrictive trade policies. The following sections, 
though, present a brief synopsis of the rationale underlying the Western 
World's basic commitment to liberal trade policies, and the principal 
counter-arguments favoring somewhat restricted markets. 
1. International Free Market Perspectives 
Western economists attach significant positive value to competitive inter 
national markets. Important economic, political and social goals will be 
fostered by freely operating markets, unconstrained by either government 
action or private monopoly. A free market regime, one open to the free flow 
of goods and production factors such as capital and technology, will predic 
tably promote the efficient allocation of scarce international resources20. The 
wealth of the international community will increase as businesses, disciplined 
by the constant pressure of competition, bring together the various factors of 
production in efficient combinations21. Each nation will capture the benefits 
of its comparative advantages in the international marketplace22. The capital, 
technology and know-how of developed industrial nations, for example, 
may combine with the human and abundant natural resources of less 
developed nations to produce lower- priced finished goods. Consumers will 
tion, of such stocks or assets , or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of 
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly. 
20 
Garvey, Transnational Joint Ventures 352-354. 
21 Root 86-91. 
22 See Gray 16-25. 
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predictably be well served as the output of desired products increases and 
prices decrease. 
An international economic regime committed to unrestrained private 
transactions would also have tangible macroeconomic consequences. Indus 
try organized along international lines, efficiently exploiting the available 
resources of developing lands, will directly increase the productivity and 
wealth of the host nations. More importantly, they will bring skills, know 
how, and sometimes technology that can be transferred to other productive 
enterprises. Such nations, therefore, develop over time the capacity for 
independent and more broadly based economic expansion23. 
Political and social benefits will also be likely to flow from the economic 
growth stimulated by an international competitive regime. History has 
demonstrated that privately concentrated and restrained industry can invite 
political intervention which is potentially untoward; the Sherman Act was, 
for example, intended in part to prevent more direct forms of government 
regulation which Congress feared might result if the perceived monopolistic 
abuses of the "trusts" were not otherwise curbed24. Private cartels facilitated 
the total control of German industry as the National Socialist Regime con 
solidated its power25. The expansion of wealth in developing nations (assum 
ing the benefits of economic expansion are reasonably distributed) might be 
expected to promote social and political stability, as a substantial middle class 
often seems to be a principal prerequisite for stable democratic government. 
2. The Theory of the Second-Best 
There are many real world constraints that make the theoretical ideal of an 
international free market unattainable. Market failure, externalities and 
transaction costs exist in international, as well as national markets26. They are 
in fact likely to be exaggerated in international transactions27. International 
traders, for example, face national monopolies, heightened transportation 
costs, language barriers, and numerous legal restrictions generally not found 
in national markets. 
National restrictions are imposed for a variety of reasons. Developed 
countries, including the United States, have restricted the free flow of goods, 
technology and capital. Some restrictions have been justified by legitimate 
security concerns28, since national defense, for example, might be prejudiced 
23 
Gray 379 f. 
24 H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (1954) 226 f. 
25 Rahl 245. 
26 ?oo? 61-74. 
27 
Garvey, Transnational Joint Ventures 354?357. 
28 Root 1S5(. 
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if confidential military equipment and know-how could readily pass to 
hostile nations. The preservation of jobs is the most likely significant political 
motivation for protective policies. Economic theory suggests, however, that 
such policies are not likely to serve national interests, and certainly will ill 
serve the international community29. Nevertheless, an analysis of trade policy 
that failed to appreciate the political influence of the labor force, or the social 
upheaval likely to accompany the loss of significant numbers of jobs would 
be seriously flawed. 
The reasons for various restrictions of international commerce and the 
diverse nature of such legal and extra-legal constraints, only some of which 
have been identified above, provide an economic rationale for national 
responses which interfere with free market forces, a rationale encompassed 
by the so-called theory of the second-best30. In essence, the theory assumes or 
recognizes that the first-best option 
- 
free international markets - is not 
possible, for whatever reason. The best policy, therefore, must accept real 
world limitations and impose such restraints on trade as are necessary to 
achieve the optimal performance possible under the circumstances. 
The economic theory of the second-best assumes that second-best policies 
will foster the most efficient possible allocation of international resources. In 
the hands of national policy-makers, however, the concept may assume a less 
international orientation. Market distortions imposed by one nation are often 
likely to provoke protective or retaliatory responses that are unlikely to 
enhance the wealth of the international community. 
3. Developmental Perspective 
As briefly outlined (supra, 1), certain economic theories suppose that 
national economic growth and development will occur when previously 
scarce factors of production (such as management skills and technology) pass 
to nations hosting foreign enterprises. Many less-developed nations, how 
ever, believe that the liberal trade and investment policies established by 
industrialized nations substantially affect their domestic economies by limit 
ing their ability to control development and denying them a fair share of the 
generated wealth31. Development supposedly driven by market forces has 
often failed to satisfy national economic, social and political needs. The view, 
given theoretical support within the theory of the second-best (supra, 2), that 
free international markets are in fact not possible, makes this conclusion less 
surprising. Imbalances of financial, technological and bargaining power and 
29 
Gray 166-168. 
30 See Root 161 f. 
31 
Spero 27; Gray 287 f. 
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resources between trading partners in developed and less developed states 
respectively would be relevant elements in the specific application of the 
theory of the second-best in this context. The frustration of the desire, for 
example, for an independent, locally-controlled and diverse economy by an 
international market interested solely in exploiting an abundant resource 
such as unskilled labor can then be regarded as an expected outcome. In 
response to such concerns, many nations have imposed restrictions on trade 
in goods and investment in order to foster domestic developmental goals32. 
Restrictive national policies intended to promote development are fre 
quently intended to protect infant industries33, to insure local participation in 
management34, and to foster the transfer of valuable technology and know 
how35. Many developing countries apparently have little faith in the ability of 
markets alone to deliver the resources they need for independent economic 
vitality. Moreover, some of these concerns are not limited to less developed 
countries. Canada, for example, presumably in response to a fear that Ameri 
can corporations would dominate its economy, restricts investments by 
foreign firms in Canadian businesses36. 
In spite of demands that free market forces be moderated to achieve 
national developmental objectives, the developing nations of the West 
remain essentially committed to liberal trade and investment policies37. They 
wish to purchase goods in competitive markets and to sell their natural 
resources and products to non-cartelized buyers38. In any case, foreign capital 
and skills are essential to the growth of less developed economies. Therefore, 
the arguments favoring restrictive policies to foster development can justify 
only limited governmental restraint. 
32 
Garvey, Transnational Joint Ventures 354 f.; see Gray ch. 13. 
33 
Gray 162-166. 
34 R. Radway, Antitrust, Technology Transfer and Joint Ventures in Latin American 
Development: Lawyer Am. 15 (1983/84) 47-70 (64). Gray (382-391) characterizes the 
problem as a perceived loss of sovereignty. 
35 "Restrictive Business Practices ..." (supra n. 8) p. 374 f.; Radway (supra n. 34) 51-75. 
36 Investment Canada Act (S.C. 1985, c. 20), replacing the Foreign Investment Review 
Act (S.C. 1973-74, c. 46); see 5. Le Gou?ff, Loi sur Investissement Canada, Le contr?le des 
investissements au Canada [L?gislation]: Can.Bar.Rev. 64 (1986) 703-720; Was the Sigh of 
Relief Premature?, The Investment Canada Act [Note]: Vand.J.Transn.L. 19 (1986) 
613-650. On October 4, 1987, the United States and Canada agreed in principle to establish 
free trade between the two nations; see S. Auerbach, U.S.-Canada Pact to Cut Trade Rules: 
The Washinghton Post, October 5, 1987, p. 1. col. 6. As to the former Canadian Act of 1973 
see T. Hadden/R. Forbes/R. Simmonds, Canadian Business Organization Law (1984) 79-82. 
37 
"Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on Its 
Sixth Session", UNCTAD-Doc. TD/B/C. l/AC.6/20 (1979), repr. in: Anti-Trust and 
Restrictive Business Practices I. Booklet 6, p. 134. 
38 
"Principles and Rules and Other Issues Relating to Restrictive Business Practices", 
UNCTAD-Doc. (TC/231) (1979), repr. in: Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business Practices I. 
Booklet 6, p. 59 f. 
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III. International Cartels and National Competition Policy 
Cartels have been defined as "voluntary agreements among independent 
enterprises in a single industry or closely related industries with the purpose 
of exercising a monopolistic control of the market"39. International cartels 
pursue the same goals but their actions can have implications for more than 
one nation. 
Although governments often tolerate40, and sometimes foster cartels to 
achieve national economic goals41, the theoretical and historical case against 
unregulated private cartels is overwhelming. Driven solely by the desire for 
profits, they distort and restrict international trade. Most industrialized 
nations, therefore, will not tolerate such activities if they affect their markets42 
and the developing world considers private cartels to be inimical to their 
economic goals43. 
In the absence of an internationally accepted and enforceable prohibition 
against cartels, the extraterritorial application of national competition laws 
must play a key role in the battle against privately monopolized international 
trade. Measures taken to avoid anticompetitive domestic effects by the 
world's major trading nations have prevented the re-creation of the cartels 
that dominated much international commerce between the two World 
Wars44. Most nations have been unconcerned, however, about domestic 
cartels which direct their activities towards foreign consumers and com 
petitors. The tolerance of such cartels represents, I believe, a short-sighted 
economic policy. 
True international cartels, those achieving and exercising monopoly 
power, have undesirable political and economic consequences45. Competing 
producers, including those within domestic markets, must necessarily dis 
cuss and reach agreements regarding production and prices if a cartel is to be 
effective. Although under most antitrust exemptions their decisions are not 
legally limited when applying to matters that affect only foreign sales and 
customers, the related exchange of information and decision making pro 
39 "International Cartels" (1947) 1 (United Nations Department of Economic Affairs). 
40 Rahl 260-263. 
41 Rahl 263-266. 
42 Rahl 250. 
43 
"Principles and Rules ..." (supra n. 38). 
44 International Cartels (supra n. 39). 
45 The term "true international cartels" is intended to distinguish cooperative entities that 
may be appropriately identified as joint ventures. These terms 
- "cartel" and "joint venture" 
-lack precise meaning under American law. I am, however, using the term cartel to identify 
cooperative activities intended to achieve, maintain, or exercise monopoly power, i.e., 
restrict output and raise prices; seeJ. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy: Harv. L. 
Rev. 95 (1982) 1521-1591 (1524-1527), and Garvey, Transnational Joint Ventures 335f. 
(adopting Brodley's definition). 
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cesses in industries having characteristics appropriate to cartels is almost 
certain to have domestic consequences. Rational business people are simply 
too aware of their own economic interests to blind themselves to the potential 
domestic benefits of their agreements. Similarly, when national cartels join 
with foreign producers, the temptation to respect each other's home markets 
will be great. 
In the international marketplace, cartels impair economic growth and 
unfairly exploit the consumers and producers of vulnerable nations. 
Developing countries will be unlikely to enjoy the benefits of freer markets 
when they face cartels tolerated by the nations that could most effectively 
control them46. Cartels, therefore, contribute to an international environ 
ment that limits growth, generates hostility, and prompts disadvantageous 
counter-measures that could and should be avoided. 
IV. The Role of American Antitrust Law 
The American antitrust laws have traditionally enjoyed a special legal 
status. The Sherman Act, for example, has been described by the United 
States' Supreme Court as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise"47 and it has 
been treated with the reverence normally accorded only to constitutional 
provisions. Antitrust also fostered goals other than economic efficiency. 
Judge Hand, for example, stated in the landmark Alcoa decision that the legal 
aversion to monopoly is "based upon the belief that great industrial consoli 
dations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results"48. In 
1962, the Supreme Court had adopted a similar interpretation of sec. 7 of the 
Clayton Act: 
"We cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through 
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that 
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented 
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of 
decentralization. 
"49 
Interpreted in this way, the antitrust laws clearly represented a statement of 
fundamental political, social and economic policy. 
Despite this strong philosophical commitment to the principles of anti 
trust, the American belief in competition has experienced lapses, in domestic 
as well as in foreign applications. Some industries have been exempted from 
the rule of competition although they are generally subject to some form of 
46 Rahl 261 f. 
47 United States v. Topeo Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
48 United States v. Aluminum Co. ojAmerica (supra n. 16) 428. 
49 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
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government regulation intended to protect the public from monopolistic 
abuse. During the Great Depression the United States' commitment to 
competition had almost collapsed as the government turned to cartels spon 
sored by the National Recovery Administration (NRA) in order to pull the 
country out of its financial distress50. 
The international scope of the antitrust laws has also changed significantly 
with time. The first several decades of antitrust enforcement were marked by 
little interest in the extraterritorial reach of the laws. In 1909, the Supreme 
Court embraced a strict jurisdictional standard of territoriality that limited 
the Sherman Act's prohibitions primarily to domestic activities51. This rigid 
approach began to erode shortly after it was created52, but a sweeping "effects 
standard" was not adopted until 194553. 
In 1894 Congress enacted the Wilson Tariff Act54, making it illegal to 
restrain the import commerce of the United States. In 1918, however, the 
Legislature passed the Webb-Pomerene Act55, demonstrating that it was less 
concerned about export restraints. Export associations were given a qualified 
exemption from the application of the antitrust laws. During this same time 
period, the Ocean Shipping Act of 191656 granted ocean carrier conferences an 
antitrust exemption subject to regulatory oversight. 
It is not surprising that the United States' antitrust laws played a relatively 
minor role in the international arena prior to World War II. The regulation of 
international trade was the province of tariffs and the United States was in an 
isolationist mood57. America came out ofthat War, however, with its indus 
trial structure intact, great faith in its economic philosophy, with the antitrust 
laws at its core, and the ability and willingness to lead the World's non 
Socialist industrialized nations58. 
For several decades during and following the War, therefore, the American 
commitment to competition was renewed. The Supreme Court, in the 
Socony-Vacuum decision59, implicitly but emphatically abandoned the pro 
cartel stance it had adopted only a few years earlier in the Appalachian Coals 
case60. It also demonstrated in the Timken decision that it had no tolerance for 
50 The NRA was created under the authority of sec. 2 of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. ?702 (1934), which was declared unconstitutional in A. L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
51 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (supra n. 15). 
52 
Garvey, Antitrust Improvements Act 7f. 
53 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (supra n. 16). 
54 Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, ??73-77, 28 Stat. 570 (1894), 15 U.S.C. ??8-11. 
55 
Export Trade Act, ch. 50, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. ??61-65. 
56 




Spero 26 f. 
59 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
60 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
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international cartels and that it would not seriously consider the exigencies of 
international commerce as justifying such conduct61. Largely for economic 
reasons, the Webb-Pomerene exemption became insignificant62, and the 
Shipping Act, as amended in 196163, seriously limited the potential for 
anticompetitive abuses by ocean shipping conferences64. 
In the post-War environment, the United States pursued an expansive 
international antitrust policy on several fronts. The Allies, believing that 
cartels had played a major role in the growth of the totalitarian regimes that 
led the world to war, were willing to impose favored economic policies on 
defeated lands65. The Justice Department was also determined to enforce 
vigorously the antitrust laws against international cartels66. The Alcoa67 deci 
sion's expansive jurisdictional standard based on "effects" made aggressive 
enforcement possible and the government demonstrated its resolve to dis 
mantle cartels68. 
This expansive approach to antitrust enforcement had a natural impact on 
consumers and producers of other nations.The American economy was 
dominant in the non-Socialist World and participation in that vital economic 
market required, by and large, compliance with American competition 
policy. Moreover, American firms engaging in business abroad were gener 
ally unwilling to participate in local cartel activities for fear of potential 
antitrust liability in the United States69. Competition was at times, therefore, 
injected into economies that were domestically open to cartelization. Con 
sumers in other countries received both the benefits of enhanced competition 
and the right to claim treble damages under the Clayton Act for injuries 
resulting from an antitrust violation70. Both the restrictions and rights of the 
antitrust laws were thus applied to American foreign commerce. 
The extraterritorial enforcement of United States' antitrust laws has, of 
course, not been universally welcomed. Some nations consider that such 
activities tread on their sovereignty71, and American and foreign businessmen 
alike often claim they have been treated unfairly when made liable for 
activities that are legal in the countries where they occurred. American 
antitrust law has recognized the partial validity of these claims and tradition 
61 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
62 
J. Ongman, Is Somebody Crying "Wolf?, An Assessment of Whether Antitrust 
Impedes Export Trade: NW.J. Int. L. Bus. 1 (1979) 163-218 (193-202). 
63 Amendment of 1961, Pub. L. 87-254, 75 Stat. 522 (1961). 
64 
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 16-19. 
65 Rahl 247. 
66 
Fugate ? 1.2; Kronstein 448 f. 
67 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (supra n. 16). 
68 
Fugate ?1.2. 
69 Rahl 248. 
70 
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-315 (1978). 
71 Atwood/Brewster I ?? 4.06-4.13. 
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ally employed three related doctrines to protect the sovereignty of other 
nations and to address the fairness concerns of private businesses. First, 
foreign sovereign immunity provides extensive protection in suits against 
foreign states for their non-commercial activities72. Second, the act of state 
doctrine precludes American courts from rendering a judgment in a private 
suit when the decision necessarily questions the wisdom or propriety of the 
acts of a foreign sovereign73. Finally, the doctrine of foreign government 
compulsion protects private parties which have acted within a foreign state in 
a manner compelled by that state's government74. In combination, these three 
doctrines drew the line - a blurry line to be sure 
- between activities having 
effects on United States' commerce requisite to successful prosecution under 
American antitrust law and those that are beyond the reach ofthat law. 
V. Changing American Perceptions 
The internationalist spirit that followed World War II lasted for several 
decades. Throughout this period the United States, through persuasion, 
agreement, and the application of its antitrust laws fostered freer interna 
tional trade. Several factors in recent years have, however, produced a more 
parochial outlook in the United States. 
1. Foreign Competition 
In the 1970s, American producers began to face increasingly effective 
foreign competition in foreign and domestic markets that were once secure75. 
Established American industries, communities, and workers suffered as a 
result of new international competitive realities. Not surprisingly, important 
72 In 1976, the United States adopted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976), 28 U.S.C. ??1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 
1602-1611, which does not exempt commercial activities from suit; see H. Strebet, Staaten 
immunit?t, Die Europaratskonvention und die neuen Gesetze der Vereinigten Staaten und 
Gro?britanniens: RabelsZ 44 (1980) 66-98 (comparing European Convention with British 
and American statutes); Th. Hill, Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 
Theory and Policy in United States Law: ibid. 46 (1982) 118-164. 
73 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes 
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (CD. Cal. 1971), affirmed: 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), 
certiorari denied: 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), 
certiorari denied: 434 U.S. 984 (1977); see Hill and Strebel 71-73 (supra n. 72); P. Hay, 
International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States: RabelsZ 35 (1971) 
429-495 (478-485). 
74 Atwood/Brewster I ?? 8.14-8.23. 
75 
Garvey, Antitrust Improvements Act 3. 
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American political constituencies have sought protection, often claiming 
they were victims of unfair competitive practices. The political pressure to 
interfere with freely operating international markets became extreme as the 
United States experienced extraordinary trade imbalances over the past 
several years76. In fact, the United States is now the greatest nation-debtor in 
history77. Moreover, economic predictions that 
a weaker dollar would solve 
the problem of trade deficits have proven to be false; and, similarly, experi 
ence has shown that American producers cannot, as some had expected, 
dominate markets for high-technology products78. In short, America's inter 
national economic problems are acute and the solutions are evasive. 
The search for ready answers to complex problems involving American 
competitiveness and trade flows has often focused on antitrust79. Some in the 
business community have claimed that the antitrust laws have impaired their 
ability to enter into efficient combinations needed to penetrate foreign mar 
kets80. Neither legal analysis nor factual evidence support such claims, but 
they have credibility in the halls of Congress81. In this environment, it is not 
surprising that American policy-makers and legislators have largely aban 
doned a sweeping vision of international growth and development through 
free markets, as well as the resolve to extend the benefits and restrictions of 
the antitrust laws to foreign producers and consumers. The United States' 
commitment to competition has sagged. 
2. The Influence of the "Chicago School" 
The successful assault by the "Chicago School" of Neo-Classical econo 
mists on substantive antitrust law has also had substantial impact on the 
perceived nature of the laws and their appropriate goals82. In the process of 
76 The United States' current account deficit reached a record of 140.57 billion Dollars in 
1986; International Herald Tribune, March 18, 1987, p. 1, col. 1. 
77 International Herald Tribune loc. cit. (supra n. 76). 
78 5. Auerbach, A New Economic Role for U.S.: International Herald Tribune, April 17, 
1987, p. 1, col. 2. 
79 
Garvey, Antitrust Improvements Act 3f. 
80 ReinschbS?. 
81 
Ongman (supra n. 62) 216 f. 
82 The term "Chicago School" lacks precise meaning. It is a body of policies and 
assumptions developed by economic theoreticans at the University of Chicago over several 
decades and reflected in the approach to antitrust law originally adopted by certain legal 
scholars at that university. Advocates of both the general economic premises and of the 
specifically legal aspects of them are found at universities throughout the United States, 
among the judiciary, and in key government positions with responsibility for antitrust 
enforcement. At some risk of oversimplification it can be stated that the legal adherents of 
the "Chicago School" believe that antitrust should properly be concerned with classic cartel 
activities (agreements between competitors to limit output and raise prices) and horizontal 
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demonstrating some of the laws' more serious flaws, proponents of reform 
stripped the antitrust laws of the special legal status achieved when the federal 
courts viewed them as a "charter of freedom"83 that embodied goals other 
than economic efficiency (see supra, IV). 
Chicago school analysts focus solely on the efficiency implications of 
business activities, that is, on their ability to increase output or lower costs. 
Their economic model does not account for the political or social benefits 
believed to be derived from a less productively efficient industrial order, nor 
does it recognize that innovation prompted by competition among numer 
ous independent businesses may ultimately produce a more efficient order 
than one committed to the immediate efficiencies of a concentrated and 
restrained industry. Their approach to the antitrust laws has, however, won 
widespread support. Even the Supreme Court has decided that the political 
and social content of the antitrust laws is too amorphous to significantly 
influence antitrust jurisprudence84. Antitrust has been reduced to 
an instru 
ment of economic efficiency and, under the prevailing economic view, it has 
failed badly in this purpose. Not surprisingly, it has now become respectable 
to challenge vigorously the basic antitrust laws85. 
The now dominant economic approach to antitrust policy also measures 
economic performance by its ability to satisfy consumer demands. The 
impact of competitive conduct 
on business rivals, workers and communities 
is, therefore, generally irrelevant to modern antitrust analysis. Judge Bork, 
for example, characterized antitrust law as a "consumer welfare prescrip 
tion"86 and the Supreme Court has adopted that characterization87. This 
emphasis on consumer satisfaction has impact 
on the United States' resolve 
to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, at least to the extent that they 
grant the protection of American law to foreigners. 
Earlier formulations of antitrust policy had placed greater emphasis on the 
value of the processes of competition. Neither market structures nor 
mergers that achieve very high levels of industrial concentration. Other restraints that may 
traditionally be subject to antitrust scrutiny are, the Chicagoans believe, generally either 
efficiency-enhancing or subject to market-generated discipline. Classic works of the "Chi 
cago School" include R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978); R. Postier, Economic Analysis 
of Law2 (1977). 
83 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States (supra n.. 60) 359. 
84 See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Syhania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n. 21 (1977). 
85 
Although the antitrust laws have gone through periods of lax enforcement, the current 
Administration is the first to endorse legislative proposals that would significantly alter and 
limit antitrust enforcement; see, in a paper read at the Conference on International Trade 
and Antitrust Laws, Nihon University, Tokyo, Nov. 6, 1986, W. Grimes, Economic 
Theory and a Century of American Antitrust Policy: Nihon-Daigaku Hikakuh? [Nihon U. 
Comp. L. Rev. (Journal)] 3 (1986) 71-90 (75). 
86 Bork (supra n. 82) 66. 
87 Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
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behavior should be allowed to impair the processes of competition. An 
environment that supports competition stimulates innovation and efficient 
marketing and production techniques. The intangible, and immeasurable 
benefits of constant competitive tension are valued more highly than the 
observable efficiency gains that sometimes accompany the elimination of 
competition88. The difference between the consumer welfare approach and 
the competitive processes approach is largely a matter of emphasis. The 
competitive processes approach is more concerned with structure and less 
sensitive to specific efficiency claims, but both are ultimately intended to 
foster efficiency and, naturally, to benefit consumers. The competitive pro 
cesses approach, however, better accommodates the political and social 
aspirations of the antitrust laws. 
The emphasis on consumers, as opposed to the assumed benefits of com 
petition itself, together with the rejection of political or social purposes for 
antitrust laws, reduces the will to impose the laws' restraints in certain 
international contexts. It perhaps removes the justification for certain 
extraterritorial applications. The United States has a clear interest in promot 
ing the benefits of an international competitive order. Expanded interna 
tional wealth, more stable political and economic regimes, and the efficiency 
born of sharp competition, all benefit the United States and its citizens. 
Politically, it is difficult, however, to justify the extraterritorial application of 
American law solely to protect foreign consumers, particularly when the 
direct and immediate effect may be to deny United States' producers the 
potential profits of monopoly. 
3. Foreign Hostility 
Various foreign governments have taken measures in recent years to 
thwart the successful prosecution of private antitrust suits against their 
nationals. Foreign hostility is, by and large, directed at American discovery 
procedures and the penal aspects of a multiple damages award in private 
suits89. Legislative efforts abroad, therefore, have been intended to "block" 
discovery and execution of a treble damage judgment90, or to provide for the 
88 See E. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust, A New Equilibrium: Cornell L. Rev. 66 
(1980/81) 1140-1192 (1142f); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (supra n. 16) 427; see 
also E. Hoppmann, Volkswirtschaftliche und wirtschaftspolitische Bedeutung des Kartell 
und Monopolrechts, in: E. Hoppmann /E. -f. Mestm?cker, Normenzwecke und Systemfunk 
tionen im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschr?nkungen (1974) 5-19 (Walter Eucken Institut, 
Vortr?ge und Aufs?tze, 50). 
89 Atwood/Brewster I ?? 4.09 f. 
90 
See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cwth.) (No. 3 of 
1984) (Australia); Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (c. 11) (United Kingdom); 
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recapture, in domestic courts, of all or part of treble damage judgments 
executed in the United States by so-called "clawback" statutes91. 
Two significant antitrust proceedings in recent years have prompted some 
strong and well publicized anti-antitrust rhetoric from America's trading 
partners: 
In the North Atlantic Conference cases of the late 1970s, a federal grand jury 
indicted several domestic and foreign shipping lines engaged in cartel 
activities in the North Atlantic trades92. Ocean Shipping cartels, known as 
"conferences", have enjoyed a qualified antitrust exemption since 1916 (see 
infra, VI4). However, for immunity to attach, the specific conduct had to be 
identified in an agreement filed with, and approved by, the Federal Maritime 
Commission (FMC)93. The North Atlantic liner firms were alleged to have 
fixed rates, pursuant to agreements never filed with the FMC, and to have 
otherwise secretly agreed to engage in conduct that violated specific prohibi 
tions of the Shipping Act. Despite the egregious nature of the alleged viola 
tions, the liner firms expressed dismay when they were prosecuted, and the 
governments of the foreign carriers objected strenuously to the imposition of 
antitrust penalties on their national lines94. 
The second case was the Laker case in the 1980s. The civil suit commenced 
by Sir Freddie Laker against several American and European airlines alleging 
they had destroyed Laker's discount transatlantic airline prompted an occa 
sionally sharp exchange between English and American courts. British judi 
cial and executive orders were issued compelling Laker and others to refrain 
from prosecuting the American suit and from complying with discovery 
demands95. For its part, the American court with jurisdiction over the case 
refused to honor the anti-suit injunction and ordered the parties to stop 
further efforts to have foreign jurisdictions interfere with the litigation96. The 
House of Lords eventually held that the British carriers were subject to the 
American antitrust laws for conduct within the territorial judisdiction of the 
United States and that only an American court could determine the merits of 
the claim97. 
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (S.C. 1985, c. 49) (Canada); and for a general 
discussion of various "blocking statutes", see Atwood/Brewster I ? 4.17. 
91 
E.g., Australia's Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cwth.) and 
the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (supra n. 90). 
92 United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Crim. No. 79-00271 (D.D.C., filed June 1, 
1979). 
93 United States v. American Union Transport, 327 U.S. 437, 445-447 (1946). 
94 Atwood/Brewster I ?3.26. 
95 "House of Lords Frees Laker to Proceed with U.S. Antitrust Suit" [Article]: Antitrust 
and Trade Reg. Rep. 47 (1984) 175-176. 
96 Laker Airways Limited v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 
1983). 
97 British Airways v. Laker Airways, [1985] A.C. 85. 
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Both the Laker and the North Atlantic Conference cases involved industries 
that are international in scope and nature, and which possess the unique 
economic characteristics of transportation common carriers. Historically, 
such industries have created government sanctioned cartels in order to estab 
lish rates and conditions of service98. The adverse reactions of the parties to 
potential antitrust liability, therefore, as well as their governments, is some 
what understandable. Their outcry, however, fed the perception in the 
United States that the American commitment to competition is generally not 
welcome beyond its borders. 
VI. Modern Legislative Developments 
The factors identified above - the search for simple solutions to America's 
sagging international competitiveness; the perception that the United States' 
antitrust policy is widely resented abroad; and the ascendency of a narrow, 
purely economic, consumer-oriented model 
- 
laid the foundation for a 
notable legislative withdrawal from the expansive concept of antitrust law as 
an instrument of international economic development. Legislative proposals 
to adjust the international scope of the antitrust laws demanded increased 
congressional attention at the beginning of the current decade99. In 1982, this 
effort came to fruition with the enactment of three laws: the Foreign 
Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act100, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve 
ments Act101, and the Export Trading Company Act102. In 1984 Congress also 
enacted the Shipping Act103, and it continues to consider other proposals to 
adjust the international reach of the antitrust laws. 
98 See B. Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (1962) 246-252; W. Koffler, 
IATA-Its Legal Structure, A Critical Review: J. Air L. Com. 32 (1966) 222-235; R. Agman, 
Competition, Rationalization, and United States Shipping Policy: J. Mark. L. Com. 8 
(1976/77) 1-50 (9-29). 
99 
See, e.g., Export Trading Company Act of 1981, S. 734, 97th Cong., IstSess. (1981); 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1981); Reinsch 47. 
100 Act of Dec. 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-393, 96 Stat. 1964 (1982), codified at 15 U.S.C. 
? 15(b). 
101 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, Title IV, 96 
Stat. 1233 (1982), codified at 15 U.S.C. ??6a, 45(a) 
= Int. Leg. Mat. 22 (1983) 363 (370). 
102 
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, Titles I and III, 96 Stat. 
1233(1982), codified at 15 U.S.C. ??4011-4021 
= Int Leg. Mat. (supra n. 101) 363 and 367. 
103 
Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (1984), codified at 46 U.S.C. 
??1709-1719. 
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1. Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act of 1982 
The Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act of 1982ll)4 was a direct 
response to the Supreme Court's decision of 1978 in Pfizer v. Government of 
India105. In Pfizer, the Court held that foreign governments are "persons" 
within the definition of sec. 4 of the Clayton Act. As persons, they are 
entitled to sue and recover treble damages for injuries suffered by reason of a 
violation of the antitrust laws. The fact that they are foreign, and sovereign 
states, does not, the Court held, justify a different conclusion. 
The Supreme Court identified several reasons for its decision in Pfizer. 
Suits by foreign entities, private or sovereign, foster the enforcement goal of 
the private antitrust remedy; they "deter violators and deprive them of'the 
fruits of their illegality'"106. American consumers are, of course, indirect 
beneficiaries of such enforcement activities. The Court noted, however, that 
the compensatory purpose of the law attaches to foreign as well as domestic 
victims107. Finally, the majority opinion relied on the general rule that foreign 
nations are, as a matter of comity, entitled to the same access to civil courts as 
are domestic corporations and individuals108. 
Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
has identified two aspects of the Pfizer decision that prompted a legislative 
response109. First, treble damages were available for foreign governments 
while the government of the United States was under statutory law entitled 
only to actual damages110; and, second, nations that did not provide the 
United States with a remedy for similar acts were granted a right of action 
despite the lack of reciprocity. 
As Congress considered various so-called "Pfizer bills", proposed reci 
procity requirements became the major point of contention. In the Ninety 
Seventh Congress, the Senate passed a bill with a reciprocity provision111. 
The House of Representatives, however, would not agree to enact a law with 
that requirement. The House Judiciary Committee determined that a reci 
procity requirement would be an extraordinary international provision and 
extremely difficult to administer112. The House prevailed in this dispute. The 
,04 
Supra n. 100. 
105 
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India (supra n. 70). 
106 
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India (supra n. 70) 314. 
107 
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India (supra n. 70) 315. 
108 
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India (supra n. 70) 318 f. 
109 "Senate Passes Legislation Restricting Foreign Nations' Right to Recover Damages" 
[Article]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 1981 No. 1023, pp. A-4 to A-5. 
110 Section 4A of the Clayton Act (supra n. 19), 15 U.S.C. ? 15a, provides the United 
States' government with actual damages for injuries suffered by reason of an antitrust 
violation. 
1,1 "Senate Passes Legislation . 
. ." (supra n. 109). 
112 See House Committee on the Judiciary, "Report on the Foreign Sovereign Antitrust 
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law as enacted limits the recovery of foreign sovereigns to actual damages, 
but does not require the injured state to provide the United States govern 
ment with a similar right of recovery. If, however, a foreign government is 
acting in a commercial capacity that would deny it immunity under the 
United States' Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, it is under the new law still 
(as under Pfizer) entitled to sue for treble damages113. 
Although the Act's withdrawal of the protection of the antitrust laws is 
limited, the impact may be substantial in certain contexts. The law's apparent 
presumption that foreign sovereigns are, like the federal government of the 
United States, in a better position than private parties to detect and prosecute 
anitrust violations, or to take other selfhelp measures, is only partially true. 
The governments of developing nations, which may assume significant 
responsibility for the purchase of goods essential for the welfare of their 
citizens, such as the antibiotics at issue in the Pfizer case, may lack the 
resources to police agreements for violations of the United States' antitrust 
law. Moreover, in the face of an international cartel controlling substantial 
flows of an essential good, some governments may lack the will or power to 
protect themselves from monopolistic abuse114. In short, although countries 
with vital, diverse economies and a legal commitment to competition, such 
as the Federal Republic of Germany, are unlikely to be effected by the 
limitation of the American private antitrust remedy, developing nations may 
be more vulnerable to abuse. 
2. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982115 represents the 
most comprehensive adjustment to date of the international reach of Ameri 
can antitrust law. In response to persistent claims that the antitrust laws are 
perceived to impair efficient organizational structures for United States 
export commerce, and in the face of legislative efforts to establish a complex, 
bureaucratic immunization process for export trade associations, the Chair 
man of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, Peter 
Rodino, introduced a bill with the simple objective of clarifying the jurisdic 
Recoveries Act", H.R. No. 97-476, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), repr. in: "HouseJudiciary 
Committee Report on Damage Recoveries by Foreign Nations": Antitrust and Trade Reg. 
Rep. 42(1982)797-800. 
113 
Foreign Sovereign Antitrust Recoveries Act (supra n. 100). 
114 See "Report of the Second Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practi 
ces", UNCTAD-Doc. TD/B/600, TD/B/C.2/166 and TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 (1976) paras. 
7-13, repr. in: Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business Practices I, Booklet 6, pp. 289-291. 
115 
Supra n. 101. 
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tional reach of the antitrust laws116. The bill, as introduced would have 
established that the antitrust laws apply only to foreign conduct having a 
"direct and substantial" effect on commerce within the United States or 
excluding American firms from participation in foreign commerce117. As 
ultimately enacted, the law contains a more complex formulation, as sec. 402 
illustrates: 
Sections 1 to 7 of the Sherman Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations 
unless - 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably forseeable effect 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, 
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, 
other than this section. 
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of 
paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for 
injury to export business in the United States118. 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which has been inter 
preted to prohibit trade restraints that violate the law or spirit of the Sherman 
Act119, was similarly amended120. Surprisingly, Congress did not adopt a 
similar amendment to sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes certain 
joint ventures based on their probable anticompetitive effects121. 
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act essentially codified exist 
ing enforcement policy122. It is consistent with the majority of relevant case 
law and was seen as necessary only to eliminate doubts generated by a few 
judicial decisions implying that a de-minimis effect would be sufficient123. 
This Act also represents only a partial withdrawal of the protection afforded 
foreign victims of antitrust violations. Illegal activity having the proscribed 
effect on domestic or import commerce remains subject to suit by all injured 
116 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., IstSess. 
(1981); see remarks of Representatives Rodino and McClory, 127 Cong. Ree. H 779 (daily 
ed. March 4, 1981). 
117 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981 (supra n. 116). 
118 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (supra n. 101) sec. 402. 
119 See Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
120 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717 (codified at 15 U.S.C. ??41-51) 
sec. 5 as amended by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (supra n. 101) 
sec. 403, codified at 15 U.S.C. ? 45(a). 
121 
Garvey, Exports, Banking and Antitrust 834. 
122 
Atwood/Brewster, 1986 Cumulative Supplement ?6.21B. 
123 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977); 
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf& Western Industries, 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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parties, foreign and domestic124. When an action, however, is based solely on 
the adverse impact on American export firms, any recovery is limited to the 
affected exporters125. 
Although the Act does not, in fact, significantly alter American competi 
tion law in so far as it relates to foreign commerce, the idea that the antitrust 
laws established rights for, as well as imposed obligations on, foreign entities 
has again suffered. Foreign consumers and producers are fully subject to the 
antitrust laws for conduct having the requisite impact on United States' 
commerce; they are, however, entitled to the protection of the American law 
only when their private actions help deter violations that have a direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable anti-competitive effect on American 
consumers and producers. 
3. Export Trading Company Act of 1982 
Title III (sees. 307-312) of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982126 
established a certification procedure, allowing the Secretary of Commerce, 
with the concurrence of the Attorney General, to grant qualified immunity to 
export associations. Section 303(a) of the Act provides that applicants shall be 
certified to engage in export activities if such conduct will: 
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of trade 
within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export trade of any 
competitor of the applicant, 
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the United States 
of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class exported by the applicant, 
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in 
the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class exported by the 
applicant, and 
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in the sale for 
consumption or resale within the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, 
or services exported by the applicant127. 
124 Courts interpreting the new law have been reluctant to find the requisite adverse effect 
on United States commerce when the immediate effects of alleged violations occur abroad, 
see Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (allegations of 
"spillover" price-enhancing effects in the United States through an international conspiracy 
to control sales of a specific antibiotic met the requisite domestic effects standard were 
rejected by the court); Liamuiga Tours v. Travel impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1985); Papst Motoren GmbH & Co. KG v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F. 
Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
125 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (supra n. 100), codified at 15 
U.S.C. ?6a. 
126 
Supra n. 102. 
127 
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (supra n. 102) sec. 303(a), codified at 15 U.S.C. 
? 4013(a). 
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Certification protects the holder from criminal prosecution under the 
antitrust laws and limits any recovery in civil suits to actual damages128. 
As with the other laws enacted in 1982 (see supra, 1 and 2), the Trading 
Company Act does not represent a major change in American law; export 
associations have enjoyed a qualified exemption since 1918129. It is also not 
unusual for export cartels to operate free of domestic competition policies130. 
The Act, however, does provide additional evidence that the United States is 
increasingly reluctant to extend the benefits of the antitrust laws beyond its 
own nationals, and, perhaps more disturbingly, it represents a significant 
commitment of the United States to the supposed benefits of cartels. 
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, which has survived despite the enact 
ment of the Trading Company Act, provides export associations with anti 
trust immunity, provided their activities do not have certain specified anti 
competitive effects131. The government of the United States, however, plays 
a limited role under the Webb-Pomerene Act. Associations seeking the 
protection of the law must file a notice with the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), which may investigate when it has reason to believe that an associa 
tion is not in compliance with the Act, and may ask the Justice Department to 
prosecute activities it regards as illegal132. The Government, however, does 
not encourage or approve export associations under the 1918 Act; it is 
essentially a neutral law-enforcer. By comparison, the Export Trading Com 
pany Act places primary antitrust oversight responsibility in an agency 
charged with promoting American business. The Department of Commerce 
must both promote and certify trading companies133. Not surprisingly, it has 
demonstrated an insensitivity to the benefits of antitrust policy in the past134, 
and there is already evidence that this insensitivity is being reflected in the 
certification process135. 
128 
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (supra n. 102) sec. 306, codified at 15 U.S.C. 
?4016. 
129 
Export Trade Act (supra n. 55). 
130 Set Rahl 261. 
131 The legislative proposal that evolved into Title III of the Export Trading Company 
Act (supra n. 102) was intended to amend the Webb-Pomerene Act (supra n. 55). Concerns 
of existing Webb-Pomerene associations about the effects on them of the emerging legisla 
tion, however, resulted in enactment of an entirely new provision that left the Webb 
Pomerene Act intact. 
132 Webb-Pomerene Act (supra n. 55), 15 U.S.C. ?65. 
133 Title I of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (supra n. 102) sec. 104, codified at 
15 U.S.C. ?4003, established an "Office of Export Trade" within the Commerce Depart 
ment. This office is to promote the creation and use of export trading companies; Reinsch 
48 f. 
134 R. Folsum, Antitrust Enforcement Under the Secretaries of Agriculture and Com 
merce: Colum. L. Rev. 80 (1980) 1623-1643 (1634). 
135 See Horizons International, Inc. v. Baldridge, 624 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (E.D. Penn. 
1986), reversed, 811 F. 2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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The policy judgments implicit in the determination to shift government 
from a neutral enforcement role to that of an active promoter of trade 
associations may prove detrimental to both domestic and international 
economic aspirations. This is so at least to the extent that such associations 
embody the characteristics of traditional cartels, such as the NRA sponsored 
associations of the 1930s136. United States' producers, for example, may be 
diverted from the productive, efficiency-enhancing activities that are vital to 
a domestic and internationally competitive economy. Forming government 
sponsored associations that need not compete will often be easier than assum 
ing the risks and costs of innovation. Moreover, the Trading Company Act is 
based largely on certain assumptions: that efficiencies will necessarily flow 
from larger size; that power achieved through internal growth or combina 
tion will be directed solely at foreign consumers and competitors; and that the 
government can, in combination with industry, organize exporters and 
export intermediaries better than competitive market forces137. Each of these 
assumptions is at best suspect under both economic theory and practical 
experience. 
Internationally, the Trading Company Act erodes further the role that 
American antitrust law has played as an instrument of progressive interna 
tional economic policy. Rather than promoting the allocation of international 
resources through the non-political actions of markets, American antitrust 
policy has assumed the appearance of a protectionist measure: forcing its 
competitive norms on all who do business in the United States, while 
tolerating, sometimes even promoting, anticompetitive combinations when 
the impact will be felt abroad. 
4. Shipping Act of 1984 
Two years after enacting the 1982 Acts (supra, 1-3), the Congress adopted 
the Shipping Act of 1984138. This Act represents perhaps the most extraordi 
nary American commitment to cartels since the Sherman Act was passed in 
1890. After an extensive study of ocean-liner cartels, Congress determined in 
136 See supra n. 50. 
137 
Garvey, Exports, Banking and Antitrust 821-827. 
138 
Supra n. 103. 
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1916 that the economics of the ocean liner industry justified the cartelized 
conference system, but that regulatory oversight was essential to prevent the 
abuses that had been identified139. 
In the late 1950s, both the Judiciary Committee and the Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives conducted 
investigations of the liner industry140. The Judiciary Committee found the 
industry to be essentially free of regulatory oversight and to have continually 
engaged in abusive practices141. As a result, sec. 15 of the Act of 1916 was 
amended in 1961142. Among other things, the amendments required: that 
conferences be "open", i. e., that any qualified carrier be allowed to join; that 
members be free to resign without penalty; and that the members of con 
ferences involved in interconference agreements retain a right of independent 
action143. In combination, these requirements were intended to insure work 
able competition in the conference system. In addition, the 1961 amendments 
provided that conference agreements were to be disapproved if "contrary to 
the public interest"144. 
The "public interest" standard proved to be a major barrier to anticompeti 
tive conference activities. The FMC construed the term "public interest" to 
embody the principles of the antitrust laws145. An agreement that contravened 
antitrust policy, therefore, could be approved only if its proponents "bring 
forth such facts as would demonstrate that [the proposed activity] was 
required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important 
public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping 
Act"146. This standard injected an element of competition unwelcome to the 
ocean shipping industry147. 
In the 1970s, the ocean liner industry was battered by a general slump in 
139 See House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, "Report on Steamship 
Agreements and Affiliations in the American Foreign and Domestic Trade", H.R. Doc. 
No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) 417f. This report is popularly called the "Alexander 
Report" (the name is derived from the Chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee, Joshua W. Alexander). For an excellent discussion of the ocean liner industry see 
D. Marx, International Shipping Cartels, A Study of Industrial Self Regulation by Shipping 
Conferences (1953). 
140 
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 14. 
141 See Staff of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, "Report 
on the Ocean Freight Industry", Comm. Print, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) 391-396. 
142 1961 Shipping Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-346, ?2, 75 Stat. 763 (1961), 
codified at 46 U.S.C. ?814. 
143 1961 Shipping Act Amendments (supra n. 142) ?2. 
144 1961 Shipping Act Amendments (supra n. 142) ?2. 
145 
Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C. 27, 
33-35 (1966), affirmed sub. nom. Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska 
Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968); Garvey, Regulatory Reform 15 f. 
146 
Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents (supra n. 145) 45. 
147 See Garvey, Regulatory Reform 16-19. 
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international commerce and by rapidly expanding capacity resulting largely 
from the advent of container ships148. The disequilibrium between supply and 
demand prompted aggressive competition from within and without the 
conferences, and the industry experienced many failures149. The American 
flag liner firms claimed they were at a particular disadvantage because anti 
trust policy was applied to them while their foreign competitors were not so 
restricted150. 
There was some belief in Congress that the liner industry suffered substan 
tially from the qualified application of the antitrust laws to conference 
activities151. The Shipping Act of 1984 was intended to remove all doubts, 
essentially freeing the liner industry from all antitrust exposure, even for acts 
that are illegal under the Shipping Act152. It also stripped the FMC of its 
authority to prohibit tariff agreements containing unreasonable rates, 
although the agency must enforce such tariffs153. The 
new law, therefore, 
committed the United States more than ever before to a self-regulated, 
cartelized ocean liner system. In the face of an economically distressed 
domestic industry, the legislature opted for an NRA-type solution: cartels 
would rationalize the industry and hopefully save less efficient United States 
carriers. 
It remains to be seen whether the new law will enable liner conferences to 
save themselves, or their members. Liner firms differ substantially in their 
levels of efficiency154, which makes it difficult to reach and enforce agree 
ments affecting rates and profit-levels. The new law has also authorized the 
use of "service contracts"155, i. e., agreements with specific customers to 
provide service at non-tariff rates, which will prompt competition for the 
business of large, powerful shippers. Moreover, smaller shippers have com 
bined to bargain with liner firms, and the Justice Department has indicated 
148 House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, "Report on International 
Ocean Commerce Transportation", H.R. No. 53, Part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) 6 f.; 
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 20 f. 
149 
Agman (supra n. 98) 27-29; Garvey, Regulatory Reform 9 n. 65. 
150 
"Oversight Hearings on Maritime Antitrust, Before the Subcommittee on Monopo 
lies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary", 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982) 133 f. (statement of Albert E. May, Executive Vice President, Council of American 
Flag-Ship Operators). 
151 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "Report on the 
Shipping Act of 1983", S. No. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) 7-9. 
152 
Shipping Act of 1984 (supra n. 103) sec. 7, 46 U.S.C. ? 1706(a)(2). 
153 Section 817(b)(5) of the 1916 Shipping Act (supra n. 56), as amended in 1961 (supra 
n. 142) required the FMC to disapprove rates that are "so unreasonably high or low as to be 
detrimental to the commerce of the United States", 46 U.S.C. ? 817(b). This section was 
repealed by the Shipping Act of 1984 (supra n. 103) ? 20(a). 
154 
Garvey, Regulatory Reform 21. 
155 
Shipping Act of 1984 (supra n. 103) sec. 8(c), codified at 46 U.S.C. ? 1707(c). 
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that it does not intend to challenge such organizations156. The fact remains, 
however, that the statutory law imposes very little restraint on the carriers' 
ability to organize cartels and jointly to establish the rates and conditions of 
service applicable to liner service in American trades. In addition, their 
agreements are enforced by an agency of the United States government. 
Unlike the 1982 enactments (supra, 1-3), the Ocean Shipping Act of 1984 
demonstrates little regard for American consumers. The conferences, made 
up largely of non-American carriers, may exact high rates from domestic 
producers wishing to ship goods abroad, as well as from those sending 
products for sale in the United States. The law, therefore, lacks the protec 
tionist quality of other recent enactments. It does, however, represent a 
disturbing commitment to international cartels in an area where United 
States policy once pressed for reform. 
5. Recent Legislative Proposals 
The so-called "competitiveness issue" continues to occupy a prominent 
place in the American political agenda157, and the antitrust laws continue to be 
viewed as partially responsible for the inability of many American producers 
to compete effectively in international markets. Numerous legislative pro 
posals have been introduced to deal with the perceived problem. I will discuss 
only one bill that, I believe, demonstrates how seriously the American belief 
in the antitrust laws as instruments of domestic and foreign economic policy 
has eroded. 
The Reagan Administration has recently proposed a package of legislative 
reforms, the so-called Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987, 
which includes six separate amendments to the antitrust laws158. These 
amendments would: first, limit the application of the antitrust laws in the case 
of licenses for the use of intellectual property159; secondly, establish claim 
reduction in private antitrust suits160, i. e., the reduction of the judgment debt 
by an amount proportional to that portion of the total damage which could be 
attributed to a defendant who reaches a settlement with the plaintiffs before 
156 "Division Won't Question Shippers' Proposal to Collectively Negotiate Contracts, 
Rates" [News and Comment]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 51 (1986) 96. 
157 D. Broder, Washington's New Code Word, "Competitiveness" Is the Undeclared 
Issue for 1988 Race: International Herald Tribune, April 18/19, 1987, p. 1, col. 5. 
158 
"Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987", repr. in: "Proposals to Revise 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws Excerpted from Reagan Administration's 'Trade, 
Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987"' [Article]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 52 
(1987) 348-352. 
159 
"Technology Licensing Under the Antitrust Laws" (sec. 3102), repr. in: "Propo 
sals ..." (supra n. 158)348. 
160 "Claim Reduction" (sec. 4103), repr. in: "Proposals ..." (supra n. 158) 350. 
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judgment (irrespective of the actual amount of the settlement); thirdly, limit 
treble damages in private actions to those suits involving overcharges or 
underpayments161; fourthly, establish a jurisdictional rule of reason to be 
applied in suits involving foreign commerce162; fifthly, increase the jurisdic 
161 "Treble Damage Reform" (secs. 4112-4114), repr. in: "Proposals ..." (supra n. 158) 
350 f. 
162 See 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1987 
Sec. 4121. This part may be cited as the 'Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 
1987'. 
Sec. 4122. Section 7 of the Sherman Act (15 U. S. C. 6a) is amended by 
- 
(1) inserting '(a)' before 'This Act', and 
(2) adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: 
'(b) Whenever a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under this 
section shall be made, the court shall, except for good cause shown, hear and 
determine such motion, after such discovery or other proceedings directly related 
to the motion as the court deems appropriate, before conducting or permitting the 
parties to conduct any further proceedings in the action.' 
Sec. 4123. The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 20 
the following new section: 
'Sec. 21(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the antitrust laws or any 
provision of any State laws similar to the antitrust laws, in any action brought by any 
person or State under the antitrust laws or similar State laws which involves trade or 
commerce with a foreign nation, the court shall enter a judgment dismissing the 
action as to all parties whenever it determines that the exercise of jurisdiction would 
be unreasonable primarily on the basis of the following factors 
- 
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the 
United States as compared to conduct abroad; 
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct; 
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or 
competitors; 
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the 
United States as compared with the effects abroad; 
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated 
by the action; and 
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic 
policies; 
Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the court to 
consider the effect on the foreign political relations of the United States of any 
action sought to be dismissed. 
(b) Whenever a motion to dismiss on the ground that the exercise of jurisdiction 
would be unreasonable under this section shall be made, the court shall, except for 
good cause shown, hear and determine such motion, after such discovery or other 
proceedings directly related to the motion as the court deems appropriate, before 
conducting or permitting the parties to conduct any further proceedings in the 
action.' 
Sec. 4124. Section 12 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 22) is mended by 
(1) inserting '(a)' before 'That suit', and 
(2) adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: 
'(b) The doctrine of forum non conveniens shall be applicable in any suit, action, or 
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tional amounts required under the "interlocking directorate" provisions of 
sec. 8 of the Clayton Act'63; and, sixthly, change the standards of sec. 7 of the 
Clayton Act to make mergers less problematic than under existing law164. 
The nature of the Administration's proposals demonstrates how sweeping 
the challenge to the basic American antitrust laws has become. The creation, 
for example, of a right of claim reduction, as well as the provisions relating to 
interlocking directorates, represent, in my judgment, sound legislative pro 
posals. It is difficult, however, to find a nexus between such changes and the 
ability of the United States to compete in international markets. The relation 
ship between a jurisdictional rule of reason and American productivity is also 
not obvious. Viewed as a whole, however, the proposed Act's message is 
fairly clear: greater industrial concentration through mergers, more private 
restraints on intellectual property, and less private enforcement of the anti 
trust laws are expected to enhance American competitiveness. 
The jurisdictional rule of reason proposed by the Administration is the 
only provision that relates directly to the foreign application of the antitrust 
laws. It would require federal courts to engage in a balancing of interests 
analysis to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case165. If enacted, this provision may perhaps ease some 
of the international tension over the extraterritorial application of American 
antitrust law, by authorizing courts to dismiss cases that would adversely 
affect significant foreign interests. There is, however, evidence that courts 
would generally find American interests to be more compelling than those of 
foreign parties166. As well, representatives of the American business com 
munity have suggested that the proposed rule of reason would justify certain 
restraints on imports to the United States and that American firms should in 
fairness be permitted to participate in such conduct without fear of liability167. 
There is, in short, some danger that an open-ended jurisdictional test could 
precipitate a general deterioration in the international application of competi 
proceeding under the antitrust laws that involves trade or commerce with a foreign 
nation, and nothing contained in this section or any other venue provision applica 
ble to such suits, actions, or proceedings shall be construed to prevent dismissal of 
such a suit, action, or proceeding on the ground of forum non convenient. 
"' 
Repr. in: "Proposals ..." (supra n. 158) 351 f. 
163 
"Interlocking Directorate Act of 1987" (sees. 4131 and 4132), repr. in: "Propo 
sals ..." (supra n. 158) 352. 
164 
"Merger Modernization Act of 1987" (sees. 4141 and 4142), repr. in: "Proposals 
. . ." 
(supra n. 158) 352. 
165 See "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1987" (supra n. 162). 
166 L. Collins, English and Other Reactions to Extraterritorial Application of United 
States Law, in: The United States, Transnational Business, and the Law (supra n. *) 55-64 
(60). 
167 "Revised Foreign Trade Antitrust Measure Receives Support From Business Com 
munity" [Article]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 49 (1985) 684-685. 
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tion laws, exposing American consumers to restrained import markets, 
without significantly easing tensions over the extraterritorial enforcement of 
American law. 
VII. International Challenge 
America's trading partners may initially be relieved by the diminished 
resolve of the United States to extend the protection of the antitrust laws 
beyond its borders. They may be particularly satisfied with evolving jurisdic 
cional standards that limit somewhat the protection American consumers 
have enjoyed against foreign restraints of trade. Careful consideration, how 
ever, should provoke 
a more sober response. 
If the benefits of free commerce are to be fostered, the waning American 
commitment to competitive markets should not signal a general decline in 
international resolve. On the contrary, the burden of securing an interna 
tional marketplace largely free of cartels must necessarily fall more heavily on 
the international community. Three principal tools are available: aggressive 
enforcement of national competition laws, more extensive cooperative en 
forcement efforts, and creation of an enforceable international code. 
1. National Enforcement Activities 
The growing American acceptance of export and ocean shipping cartels 
may have the effect of inducing a more relaxed international attitude towards 
such entities. Developed industrial nations may become more tolerant of 
each others export cartels, and the United States' extraordinary support for 
the cartelized ocean liner system will surely make it more difficult for other 
authorities to press for competition in the ocean trades. 
The United States has in the past demonstrated some reluctance to prose 
cute foreign cartels which, if formed by similarly-situated American export 
ers, would be legal under the Webb-Pomerene Act168. The more aggressively 
the United States pursues export promotion policies based on assumptions 
about the apparently competitive advantages of cartels, the more difficult it 
will be to attack foreign actors seeking the same supposed advantages 
through similar conduct directed at the American market. Prosecuting such 
foreign conduct would subject the United States to the embarrassment of a 
168 Letter of Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker to Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
of February 16, 1977, quoted in: Rahl 262; see "EEC Denies Hostility to American Export 
Trade Associations Led to Antitrust Suit" [Article]: Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. 1981 
No. 1043, pp. A-4 to A-6 (A-4f.). 
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hypocritical competition policy169 and would also invite foreign retaliation 
against American export associations. 
If other nations responded similarly, refusing to challenge American ex 
port cartels to protect their own, then policies of mutual toleration could 
promote the re-development of international cartels controlling significant 
flows of commerce even between the major industrialized nations. The net 
result would be a major shift of economic power to unregulated private 
interests. Any national benefits derived from export cartels could be entirely 
offset, if not outweighed, by the harm inflicted by the export monopolies of 
other nations. International economic growth would predictably diminish as 
national and multinational combines restricted production to enhance private 
profits. The undesirable economic effects would likely be experienced by all 
nations engaging in international trade, but the impact on developing coun 
tries would be particularly acute, frustrating efforts to establish viable eco 
nomies. 
If these consequences are to be prevented, exemptions from the national 
competition laws of developed nations for export cartels should be consid 
ered unfortunate manifestations of nationalistic policies which exaggerate the 
benefits of cartels and ignore their impact on other nations. Non-cartelized 
trade, however, should continue to be pursued by refusing to tolerate foreign 
entities that abuse domestic consumers and sellers. Although such enforce 
ment policies might be considered hypocritical, they better serve national and 
international economic interests than policies of reciprocal toleration. 
The decision of the Commission of the European Community to investi 
gate wood pulp dealers (including one of the largest American Webb 
Pomerene associations) engaging in restrictive practices involving sales 
within the EC is encouraging170. Although the EC-Commission assured 
representatives of the United States that it would not treat American export 
associations as per se illegal under EC law, it did insist that those having 
anticompetitive effects within the Community were subject to prosecu 
tion171. The Commission ultimately imposed fines on the wood pulp produc 
ers and their associations'72. 
If the trend of current United States policy of greater reliance on cartelized 
industries intended to enhance performance in the international marketplace 
continues, the resolve of the EC to resist such entities will play a major role if 
a significant deterioration in the structure of the international economy is to 
be avoided. 
m 
Origman (supra n. 62) 186-188. 
170 See "EEC Denies Hostility . . ." (supra n. 168). 
,7' 
Atwood/Brewster, 1986 Cumulative Supplement ? 13.13. 
172 Commission Decision of 19 December 1984 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty (85/202/EEC, IV/29.725- Wood Pulp), O.J. EC 1985 L 85/1 (14f). 
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2. Cooperative Enforcement Efforts 
Antitrust laws are no longer a uniquely American phenomenon. Similar 
laws have been adopted by many, perhaps all, of the world's major trading 
nations173. Although qualified in every nation, the basic commitment to a 
competitive economic regime is wide-spread among non-Socialist nations. 
This modern development may partially explain the American withdrawal 
from aggressive extraterritorial enforcement of its antitrust laws; it surely 
moderates the adverse potential of the United State's new attitude. It also lays 
the foundation for an international response to the problems of private 
monopoly through cooperative enforcement efforts. 
The international community has long recognized the benefits of coopera 
tive efforts to eliminate restrictive international trade practices. For example, 
both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)174 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)175 have stressed the value of consultation and coordination of 
enforcement efforts. The United States has also entered into bilateral agree 
ments intended to minimize the tension created by American enforcement 
activities through notification and conciliation efforts176. A framework for 
cooperation, therefore, currently exists. 
Unfortunately, many national legislative enactments have been intended 
to frustrate American enforcement efforts177, and the consultative processes 
have often been used to attempt to prevent national enforcement178. There is, 
however, evidence that a growing American awareness of foreign sen 
sitivities in this area, demonstrated by a willingness to notify concerned 
foreign governments about investigations and to explain the basis for the 
173 See Fugate ?15.11. 
174 "Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member 
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade", OECD-Doc. 
C(79)154 (final) (September 25, 1979), repr. in: "Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business 
Practices", Booklet 6, pp. 129-132. 
175 See "The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control 
of Restrictive Business Practices", UNCTAD-Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), repr. in: 
Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business Practices I, Booklet 6, pp. 8f. 
176 E. g., "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters (June 29, 1982, 
repr. in: Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business Practices I, Booklet 2, pp. 1-8; Canada 
United States' "Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation in Anti-Trust Matters" (Novem 
ber 3, 1969), repr. in: ibid. pp. 9-13; Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to 
Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices (signed June 23, 1976, en 
tered into force, September 11, 1976), BGBl. 1976 II1711, repr. in: ibid., pp. 15-19. 
177 See statutes cited supra nn. 90 f. 
178 See Atwood/Brewster, 1986 Cumulative Supplement ?13.13; "EEC Denies Hostili 
ty .. ." (supra n. 168). 
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inquiry, has resulted in a more cooperative foreign posture179. The existing 
bilateral agreements on cooperation also call upon non-American parties to 
respect the United States' interest in the preservation of competitive markets. 
For its part, the United States should recognize the strong foreign aversion 
to private treble-damages actions180 and to the extensive United States' dis 
covery procedures181. Foreign cooperation would be more likely forthcom 
ing if private suits were limited to compensatory damages and discovery 
demands more carefully scrutinized than is often the case in purely domestic 
proceedings182. On the other hand, the governments of other nations should 
appreciate the depth of the traditional American commitment to freer mar 
kets and the important role that private actions have played as an enforcement 
mechanism183. They should also recognize that the foreign sovereign immun 
ity, act of state, and foreign government compulsion doctrines (supra, IV) 
provide substantial protection for enterprises that foster national policy. 
Effective multinational cooperative enforcement requires a basic under 
standing that the conduct under investigation is, like piracy, without redeem 
ing value. As long as nation states continue to employ or tolerate national 
cartels as instruments of economic policy, however, it is unlikely that sig 
nificant coordinated enforcement will seriously threaten trans-national car 
tels, at least not those that enhance domestic profit-levels at the expense of 
foreign consumers. Developmental and second-best economic policies 
(supra, II 2 and 3) will justify protective efforts. Classic private international 
cartels, however, should provoke wide-spread multinational cooperation for 
enforcement. The quinine cartel, for example, found little international 
sympathy during its prosecution in various jurisdictions184. 
3. Enforceable International Code 
The ideal solution is an enforceable international code of conduct. Such 
codes currently exist, but they lack the force of law185. To change an interna 
tional instrument regarding restrictive business practices from an agreement 
179 
Atwood/Brester, 1986 Cumulative Supplement ? 15.02. 
18(1 See Atwood/Brewster II ? 14.19. 
181 "Restrictive Business Practices" Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, UNCTAD 
Doc. TD/122, in: Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop 
ment, Third Session II (1972) 249-252. 
182 See Garvey, Study of the Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy, Report of the Committee 
on thejudiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Serial No. 8, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) 
39-41. 
183 
Garvey (supra n. 182) 1. 
184 See Fugate ?4.2. 
185 
J. Kline, International Codes and Multinational Business (1985) 72-76. 
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in principle, such as the UNCTAD Code186, to an enforceable international 
document, like the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty187, would 
require extraordinary political efforts. Participating nations would have to 
partially surrender sovereignty in the very sensitive area of economic regula 
tion. Moreover, unlike the EEC Treaty, a binding international agreement 
would have to mediate conflicting interests between developed and develop 
ing nations. A comprehensive, enforceable international competition code is, 
therefore, unlikely to be established in the foreseeable future. 
There is, however, a more modest possibility that would respond to the 
most serious threat of an increasingly parochial application of the United 
States' antitrust laws: the threat of development afresh of international car 
tels. Government-sanctioned cartels only occassionally serve legitimate 
economic interests, but they represent a reality that will not soon be abolished 
by international accord. Private cartels, however, including international 
combinations involving cartels permitted under national laws, serve no 
purpose but private gain. When they achieve and exercise monopoly power, 
international resources are misallocated, the world's consumers are ex 
ploited, and the ability of national political regimes to control domestic 
economic development is impaired. The international community, there 
fore, should have the resolve to prohibit such entities. 
An enforceable prohibition against private international cartels would 
surely not eliminate monopoly from the international marketplace. The 
unilateral practices of multinational corporations, for example, would be 
beyond the reach of such legal restraints. Government created multinational 
cartels, such as OPEC, and private restraints sanctioned through bilateral or 
multilateral agreements would also escape condemnation. 
Despite its limitations, an international prohibition against private cartels 
would serve several important purposes. It would fill the void created by the 
diminished American resolve to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, a 
policy that once promoted international economic growth and protected 
foreign buyers. An enforceable international code would also establish that 
the aversion to collective, private, unregulated monopoly is universal. Surely 
any temptation to engage in such conduct would be diminished by the 
existence of a legally enforceable statement of international condemnation. 
Finally, favorable experience with the enforcement of a clear and reasonable 
standard may eventually prompt more comprehensive agreements that 
would lead to the elimination of unjustifiable export and import cartels188. 
186 "Restrictive Business Practices" (supra n. 175). 
187 Arts. 85 and 86 EEC Treaty. 
188 See E.-J. Mestm?cker, Europ?isches Wettbewerbsrecht (1974) 26 f. (discussing earlier 
unsuccessful attempts to establish an international regime to control cartels); Petersmann 
(supra n. 4) 494-498. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
The United States' antitrust laws were once a major instrument of interna 
tional economic policy. America's economic dominance following World 
War II, its resolve to impose the antitrust laws extraterritorially, and the 
general acceptance by industrialized Western nations that liberal trade 
policies were desirable, contributed to the elimination of international cartels 
that had destabilized the world between the two great Wars. Americans 
believed that the antitrust laws were largely responsible for the nation's vital 
domestic economy and that the policies embodied in those laws could pro 
mote the economic growth and development of other countries as well. 
Much of the Western World seemed to have shared that view. They adopted 
competition laws of their own and there was no international outrage as the 
Antitrust Division launched its attack on international cartels (supra, IV). 
The past decade, however, has witnessed significant changes in American 
perceptions about the value of antitrust policy and its role in the international 
economic order. Modern antitrust enactments have accordingly demon 
strated two disturbing tendencies. First, they have largely withdrawn the 
benefits of American antitrust laws from foreign markets. American firms 
are now free to exploit foreign buyers as long as they avoid substantial 
domestic effects; they may even be encouraged by the government to do so 
through export cartels. Secondly, the modern legislation shows a remarkable 
tolerance for cartels. In the international sphere, the economic policy of the 
United States has shifted notably from a commitment to the benefits of 
competition to an acceptance of privately constrained trade. 
Neither the benefits of aggressive antitrust enforcement nor the potential 
harm of the recently-enacted American laws should be exaggerated. The 
zealous application of the United States' antitrust laws to foreign activities 
and to the foreign consequences of domestic conduct did not and will not 
insure the existence of free, competitive international markets. Nor will free 
markets neccessarily produce stable and progressive political and social 
development. As well, the American interest in foreign conduct is in some 
cases simply too attenuated to justify any legal response. The striking with 
drawal of the United States' antitrust laws from international markets, 
however, eliminates a significant barrier to the private acquisition and abuse 
of monopoly power. 
The waning American commitment to competitive international markets 
calls for renewed international efforts to control abusive private business 
practices. All nations should remain acutely aware of the dangers of isolation 
ist and protectionist economic policies. National efforts to protect domestic 
industries from foreign competition, or to penetrate foreign markets with 
government-sponsored cartels invite retaliation that can lead the world into a 
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downward economie spiral. Policies of mutual toleration of export and 
import cartels would shift significant economic power to concerns interested 
solely in restricting trade in order to maximize private profits. Under any of 
these circumstances, international wealth would diminish and the world 
subjected to the political and social upheaval that often accompanies 
diminished economic expectations. 
The international response to the new American antitrust policy should 
have several facets: efforts to eliminate existing tariffand non-tariff barriers 
should be intensified; national competition laws should be vigorously 
enforced against cartels having prohibited effects within the relevant jurisdic 
tion; cooperative enforcement efforts enhanced; and an enforceable interna 
tional code against private cartels seriously pursued. 
The challenge is great, but the effort is justified by the experience of the 
past. Freer markets are not a panacea; but an international economic order 
characterized by national trade barriers and private cartels would frustrate 
development and pose a threat to world order and peace. 
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